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Offshore Hospitality: Law, Asylum and 
Colonisation
Maria Giannacopoulos 
The purpose of this essay is to trace the ongoing relevance of two cases, 
which might too readily be dismissed as irrelevant to contemporary 
border debates and asylum policy developments.  The critical questions 
of sovereignty and hospitality that arose from Mabo and others v 
Queensland (No 2) (1992), High Court of Australia (‘Mabo’) and 
Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001), Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia 
(‘Tampa’) have lost none of their urgency or currency since the most 
profound questions of justice contained within them were cast as 
non-justiciable and so remain unresolved. The continued effacement 
of Aboriginal sovereignty and the refusal by the Australian state to 
provide refuge for asylum seekers continue to structure national and 
international spaces even as the legal issues of the cases are pronounced 
resolved and closed.  In this essay, I argue that Mabo and Tampa continue 
to be worthy of attention since the developments in sovereignty 
undertaken in their name, continue to provide an unacknowledged 
precedent for contemporary border developments.  I deploy Derrida’s 
work on law’s violence and hospitality in order to unpack the relations 
that hold between hospitality, law and violence.   
1 Law, Violence and Hospitality
In Hostipitality, Derrida spoke of the way that the term hospitality 
has a ‘troubled and troubling origin, a word which carries its own 
contradiction incorporated into it’ (2000:3). Derrida informs us that 
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hospitality allows itself to be ‘parasitised by its opposite, “hostility”’ 
(2000:3).  Elsewhere, Derrida has written about a similarly troubling 
relation that appears oppositional.  Law, as Derrida argues, is vacuous 
without the force that is contained within it. In his famous essay The 
Force of Law Derrida unpacks ‘enforceability’ which 
reminds us that there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn’t imply 
in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility 
of being ‘enforced’, applied by force. There are, to be sure, laws that 
are not enforced, but there is no law without enforceability, and no 
applicability or enforceability of the law without force (1992: 6).   
Derrida’s work points to the inherent violence of all law, even if that 
violence is present in its dormancy. In addition to this Derrida points 
to the ‘originary violence’ required to found a legal regime. He asks,
How are we to distinguish between the force of law of a legitimate 
power and the supposedly originary violence that must have established 
this authority and that could not itself have been authorized by any 
anterior legitimacy, so that, in this initial moment, it is neither legal or 
illegal – or, others would quickly say, neither just nor unjust? (1992: 6)
In the Australian context, this Derridean question makes it possible 
to frame the imposition of white colonial law as ‘originary violence’, 
a framing that generates an investigation of the very meaning of 
legality since this ‘originary violence’ was, and remains, ‘neither legal 
or illegal’. In relation to this legal ambiguity, Derrida foregrounds 
Montaigne’s thesis, which highlights that these violent ambiguities 
are effaced through the self-generated, self-serving legal narrations of 
law that invest law with transcendent qualities. Specifically, Montaigne 
contends that, ‘laws keep up their good standing, not because they are 
just, but because they are laws: that is the mystical foundation of their 
authority, they have no other’ (1992: 13). If Australian law is founded 
upon ‘originary violence’ then the possibilities for a state founded on 
that law to offer hospitality are at once extremely limited as well as 
abundant.  My suggestion here is that hospitality is a synonym for the 
exercising of sovereignty, in particular a colonial form of sovereignty. 
In Hostipitality, Derrida repeats to dramatic effect the idea that ‘we 
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do not know what hospitality is’ (2000:6). This, it would seem is partly 
because of the problematic relation between law and hospitality, since 
imposing a ‘formalization of a law of hospitality … violently imposes 
a contradiction on the very concept of hospitality in fixing a limit 
to it, in de-termining it’ (Derrida, 2000:4).  While the conceptual 
argument around the ‘self-contradictory’ and ‘impossible (Derrida, 
2000: 5) nature of hospitality is easy enough to accept, the problem of 
hospitality lies in its ongoing implication with law and sovereign power. 
Those who are in need of receiving hospitality, or asylum are reliant 
on the law’s prescriptions.  Those prescriptions emanate from a place 
where the host, acts at home, acts Indigenous over land in order to set 
the limits of asylum.  This enactment of hospitality is synonymous with 
sovereignty in that it functions, through law to maintain authority 
over the home while also maintaining the ‘the truth of authority’ 
(2000:4). As Stronks puts it ‘the power of the host implies that he 
will select and filter the visitors and guests as he would otherwise lose 
the sovereignty of his home’ (2012: 75). The exercising of hospitality 
is the exercise of sovereign will to maintain authority and privilege 
over a particular territory. There is at least a double violence here. 
If the concept of hospitality is violated by a limit set by law, then 
that violence is exacerbated when the law that sets that limit is also 
constitutively violent. 
2 Inhospitable Precedent: Sovereignty is Non-Justiciable 
The High Court in Mabo has been hailed as ground-breaking for its 
overturning of the doctrine of terra nullius. However, according to 
Ritter, 
Despite the regularity with which ‘terra nullius’ has been bandied about 
since Mabo, uncertainty exists about the precise meaning of the term. 
This confusion exists because the term has both narrow and expanded 
meanings; it is an international law doctrine, yet is often equated with 
its common law analogue (1996: 7).
This is a significant clarification on the origins of the term because 
in most analyses of Mabo, (and there have been many) little attention 
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has been paid to the way in which international law, that is the 
‘contemporary notions of justice and human rights’ mentioned in the 
Mabo judgement, was the reasoning through which the High Court 
overturned terra nullius; itself a creature of international law. The 
question that this raises is whether international law could be used 
to justify colonial violence as it was at the time of initial colonisation. 
Ritter explains that
Uninhabited territory, was always uncontroversially classified as ‘terra 
nullius’. However over time, various international law jurists expanded 
the categories of territory that were ‘terra nullius’ to include certain 
lands of inhabited territory. Whether or not inhabited land was 
included within such expanded visions of ‘terra nullius’ depended ‘on 
the degree of political development and other characteristics of the 
inhabitants’ of the land in question ... but all expanded definitions of 
terra nullius shared the common feature of explicit ethnocentricity. 
That is, each expanded version of ‘terra nullius’ expressed the right, 
under certain circumstances, of the European colonial powers to seize 
territory inhabited by indigenous people, on the basis that these people 
do not conform to European cultural norms (1996: 8).
This explanation, citing ethnocentricity as being at the core of 
all the various manifestations of terra nullius begs another question. 
Could the overturning of terra nullius also function to deny legal and 
political development of those being colonised and thus continue to 
enable ethnocentrism?  Joseph Pugliese has tracked the way in which 
the category of the human and its various classifications has functioned 
as a colonial technology: 
Prior to the establishment of the United Nations’ protocols and 
conventions on human rights ... the west deployed the category of the 
pre-human or proto-human as a biopolitical technique of governance 
within its colonised territories, denying, in the process, the rights and 
privileges that accrue from being able to inhabit the category of ‘the 
human’ (2007: 82).
Does the establishment of the United Nations, with its reason 
for coming into being to protect the human, but without disturbing 
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the colonial relations firmly entrenched in the very locations where 
universalising declarations can function to efface unequal colonial 
relations, ensure that the categories such as ‘pre-human’ and ‘proto-
human’ are still effectively in operation insofar as they are disguised 
in bodies, laws and practices that do not challenge colonial forms of 
organisation? Ritter has argued that the concept of terra nullius ‘was 
doctrinally irrelevant to whether native title existed under Australian 
common law’ (1996: 6) but it proved useful for it ‘emotively connoted 
the historical reality of how Aboriginal people had been treated upon 
colonisation’ (Ritter 1996: 7). From this position, the court could then 
overturn the doctrine in order to account for why ‘traditional Aboriginal 
rights to land had never been recognised under Australian common law’ 
(ibid). The court also ‘resolved the crisis in Australian legal discourse, 
by reaffirming the apparent equity of Australian jurisprudence. Terra 
nullius was a stage edifice that was demolished so that the good name 
of the Australian legal system could be redeemed’ (ibid). 
By uniting Pugliese’s argument of the categories of ‘pre-human’ 
being used as tools of colonial governance with Ritter’s claim that the 
rejection of terra nullius was staged like a theatrical production, it can 
be argued that the categories that Pugliese writes of are still operating 
within the legal discourses that adopt international law conventions to 
pronounce terra nullius dead. If the ‘pre-human’ is the type of human 
that cannot be understood as legally regulated, then in the continued 
denial of Indigenous laws and sovereignties, this category must still 
be seen as operational in white law. If the doctrine that was once 
central to the establishment of the white nation has been found to be 
fictitious and yet the concept of nation, as Kerruish and Purdy (1998) 
have suggested, has remained unquestioned, then upon what new basis 
does colonialism continue?  Watson (2002a: [4]) asks: 
Now post-Mabo and the ‘death’ of terra nullius, questions lay at the 
feet of the Australian state. What legitimises your entry? Do you still 
require the consent of the natives? And if we give it to you now what 
meaning will you or I give to that agreement? For who will hold the 
colonising state and its growing globalised identity to honour and 
respect our laws, territories and right to life? No one has in the past.
168
Giannacopoulos 
What is the meaning of lawful in this country if the High Court, 
an institution founded on the basis of terra nullius, continues to have 
ultimate authority to decide upon the question of its own foundation? 
What is the meaning of the lawful if law can declare terra nullius to 
have been a fiction but for this admission to have had so little impact 
on the operations of law? Moreover, since the nature of the Mabo 
decision seems, prima facie, to be a critique of colonial law, how can 
that very judgement act to strengthen the institutions of the common 
law? It was disingenuous of the High Court to declare terra nullius 
retrospectively as having been a fiction when the fiction functioned 
to generate a colonial state whose foundation cannot be questioned. If 
terra nullius is understood as having worked successfully at removing 
Aboriginal peoples from their lands and laws and in re-marking this 
space then it can be argued that terra nullius was not in fact fictitious 
since dispossession continues. Or perhaps dispossession continues 
precisely because of the overturning of terra nullius. My claim here is 
that the alleged ‘overturning’ of one fiction brings into being another: 
that the terrain of white law is a place of lawfulness and equality free 
from racial discrimination.
Stewart Motha has argued, specifically with reference to Mabo, 
that the bringing about of a so-called ‘postcolonial’ law and society is 
based on a finite conception of sovereignty (2005: 110). He argues that 
this happens in three ways throughout the High Court decision. Firstly, 
the dispossession of Indigenous peoples is attributed to an imperial 
sovereign, thereby allowing the acts of dispossession to be relegated 
to ‘a now surpassed ‘colonial’ era’ (ibid). Secondly, the grounds for the 
reception of the common law of England to Australia, is a consequence 
of an imperial assertion of sovereignty over a territory deemed ‘vacant 
land’ (terra nullius) (ibid). In this act, a finite conception of sovereignty 
permits Australian law to ‘retain and depart from this racist ground of 
law’s reception in the territory’ (ibid). This monistic conceptualisation 
of sovereignty, Motha argues, allows the legal system, which was 
‘previously concerned with the exigencies of Empire’ to ‘ripen into an 
“Australian law” no longer under the constraints of the courts in the 
hierarchy of Empire’ (ibid). 
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Thirdly, a f inite conception of sovereignty that relegates 
genocidal acts of violence against Indigenous peoples in a time long 
‘past’ ‘enables the court to inaugurate and affirm a society which reflects 
“contemporary values based on universal human rights’’’ (ibid).  The 
common sense meanings now being circulated by the High Court so 
that Australia is no longer ‘frozen in an age of racial discrimination’, 
are ‘premised heavily on the possibility of a “finite” containable colonial 
sovereignty’ (Motha 2005: 111).  That is, in Australia’s entrance into 
a postcolonial space, defined by intolerance for race discrimination 
and by the embracing of human rights, ‘a limit would have to separate 
imperial sovereignty and nation’s law now capable of recognising the 
citizenship rights (as proprietors) of indigenous people’ (ibid).
The overturning of terra nullius in the High Court Mabo decision 
is by now well known.  It may also be well known that the same case 
denied the existence of Indigenous sovereignty through the manoeuvre 
of finding that the question of sovereignty is non-justiciable. Justice 
could not be done to this question according to the logic of the court 
since to engage in this would be to ‘fracture the skeleton of principle’ 
of Australian law (Giannacopoulos 2007: 49).  In addition to the 
overturning of terra nullius, the Court recognised a form of native title 
with the important qualification that 
where the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgement 
of traditional law and any real observance to traditional customs, the 
foundation of native title has disappeared [and] cannot be revived 
(Buchan: 2002).
Tony Birch has argued that this decision has been ‘One of the key 
moments in this historical polemos of memory, that is the struggle for 
control of how Australia’s past is reconstructed’ (2006: 22).  There is 
much at stake here since Birch argues that the denial of Indigenous 
sovereignty and land is inextricably linked to interpretations of the 
past. As he powerfully asserts: ‘A sovereign right to land and the 
interpretation of the past in Australia are inextricably linked.  Land 
belonging to Indigenous nations throughout Australia was and 
continues to be contested by white Australia through acts of violence...’ 
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(Birch 2007: 110).  
Mabo is by now an old case, its main finding overly familiar but 
this is precisely why it continues to exert such power; it interprets the 
past in a way that further distances Aboriginal people further from 
their laws and lands.  The High Court in Mabo has been complicit 
in sanitising the national memory. Even as the Court overturned 
the doctrine of terra nullius, ostensibly bringing the past into view, 
this overturning was used to sanitise and forget the bloody processes 
that founded white law and which continue so long as Indigenous 
sovereignty is denied. Whilst terra nullius was overturned, the bloody 
question that founds and enables white law’s continued operations is 
excised from the national memory, as an effect of the ruling that the 
question of sovereignty is non-justiciable. The logic of the decision 
continues to function daily by affirming the legitimacy or truth of a 
violent authority.  
3 Pacific Solution to Operation Sovereign Border: Offshore 
Hospitality
In 2001, the Howard Government deployed a distinct and simplified 
discourse on sovereignty along with military strategies to prevent the 
landing of 438 asylum seekers seeking entry and refuge in Australia 
(Giannacopoulos 2005: 29).  The Federal Court legitimated this military 
turn, even if it was cloaked in law and order discourse, hiding the deeper 
more invisible violence that was occurring in this manoeuvre. While 
the Tampa case has been the impetus for much critical commentary, 
twelve years after the event it warrants re-examination given that it 
has acted as the precedent for contemporary asylum policies on both 
sides of politics.   
When John Howard famously declared that ‘Every nation has 
the right to effectively control its borders and to decide who comes here 
and under what circumstances’ (Giannacopoulos 2005: 39), his position 
as sovereign was affirmed in law by Justice French of the Federal Court, 
a man who would later be appointed in 2008 as Chief Justice in the 
highest court of the land. In his judgement back in 2001 Justice French 
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rationalised the approach taken by the Howard regime by couching 
his decision in deference to executive power and the importance of this 
discretionary category to be used to maintain ‘Australia’s status as an 
independent, sovereign nation state’ (Giannacopoulos 2005: 39).  This 
move had significant parallels to the ruling made by the High Court in 
Mabo; the Court while deeply implicated in exercising power in favour 
of a particular form of sovereignty, insulated that very category from 
critique. In Tampa Justice French declared that, ‘these powers may be 
exercised for good reasons or for bad. That debate however is not one 
for this court to enter’ (2001: [192]).   In Mabo the court declared the 
nature of sovereignty was non-justiciable and the outcome of Tampa 
demonstrates precisely what was at stake in that ruling. If the nature 
of colonial sovereignty had been questioned in 1992, this could not 
continue to operate as the legitimate basis for further enactments of 
sovereignty at the border.  The continuing significance of these cases 
lies in the way that they narrate power and where and in whose interests 
it can be exercised legitimately.
In Hostipitality, Derrida engages with Kant’s claim that 
hospitality is a ‘human right’, more specifically with the ‘right of the 
stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone 
else’s territory’ (2000: 4).  But there are limits to Kant’s vision of this 
human right since he argues that the stranger ‘can indeed be turned 
away, but he must not be treated with hostility so long as he behaves 
in a peaceable manner in the place he happens to be’ (qtd in Derrida 
2000:5).   Kant’s position runs parallel to the policy that was formulated 
by the Howard Government during the Tampa events. I argue this 
because those seeking asylum were turned away and arguably were not 
treated with hostility since they were not sent back to their countries 
of origin. Instead, they were sent to third locations under the freshly 
engineered Pacific Solution.   In Tampa, the denial of asylum was an 
executive act of state, criticised as inhumane and as contrary to both 
law and human rights. These criticisms, while valid, do not account 
for the way in which the exclusion of the refugees was in fact driven 
by discourses of human rights, specifically through the principle of 
non-refoulement. Not sending asylum seekers back to the frontier of 
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danger simultaneously became the way that a human rights principle 
was upheld, while using those seeking refuge as the vehicle for new 
policy initiatives. Following Kant’s idea of right, it becomes possible to 
see Australian hospitality, as a limited human right, which reinforces 
a colonial sovereign imperative along with an imperialising vision. 
With the Pacific Solution began the policy now preferred by both 
major parties in Federal politics; hospitality to asylum seekers can 
only exist offshore. 
While the law of the state comes to be central in whether asylum 
seekers are ultimately protected, states do not exercise their violent 
power by completely disregarding international law. International 
law is not the opposite of state law but rather its competent partner 
in maintaining colonial sovereignty at home and in enabling neo-
liberalising missions abroad.  Colin Harvey has argued that whilst in 
other epochs it may have been to theology that people looked to for 
a higher law above and outside of the state, in the context of secular 
societies this approach proves insufficient as it lacks rationality. In 
relation to this, he argues ‘God may well be dead, but now we have 
international law. International law reflects an expansive vision of 
human rights that attach to the person and not solely the citizen’ (2001: 
95-96). Harvey identifies the way in which human rights, in the context 
of international law, are viewed as a superior source of protection for 
humans, who are not citizens, and therefore outside of the protection 
of law. By suggesting that international law becomes the replacement 
for God, Harvey alludes to the distance that may exist between the 
protection promised and the protection delivered by this contemporary 
higher source. Through the comparison to God, it becomes possible 
to argue that what is important for international law is the perception 
and belief in it, rather than its ability to deliver protection and justice 
to those most in need. International law, whilst often appearing as 
humane and as the cure for ills resulting from the state/citizen order, 
remains fundamentally tied to its own history. That is, in international 
law ‘new normative concepts were developed that aimed to humanize 
the violence of war’ (Bates 2007: 14). 
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During Tampa those who were forcibly held outside Australia, 
but inside its punishment zone, were not denied freedom in detention 
centres. In Tampa, ‘the desert and the ocean alike become prisons. 
More than two hundred years after the convict ships the Pacific is 
again imagined as penal zone’ (Perera 2002: 3). In this deceptively 
simple statement, Perera captures the logic of the camp, economically 
articulating the ever expanding geopolitical reach of prison Australia, 
whilst situating the ever narrowing and violent places offered to those 
in need of asylum in the context of Australia’s colonising presence in 
the region. As Mitropoulos argues, the law ‘as the installation of a 
sovereign and jurisdictional authority – does not secure human rights; 
it both grants and denies them at its discretion’ (2003).   This was 
dramatised in the first instance Tampa judgement (Victorian Council 
for Civil Liberties v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
(2001)) where Justice North decided to enable the refugees to land in 
mainland Australia legally, a judgement that never took effect since it 
was overturned at appeal. He said:
The situation of the 433 rescued by the MV Tampa has attracted 
considerable public attention and discussion. In these circumstances 
it is necessary to stress that the role of the Court is strictly confined. 
It has a duty to apply the law of Australia ... Judges of the Court take 
an oath on appointment to do justice ‘according to law’ ... Questions 
of policy concerning the way Australia should treat refugees are solely 
questions for the government (2001: [12]).
Here it is evident that Justice North does not simply make the 
substantive decision but takes the opportunity to narrate the role of 
the Court, that being to apply ‘the law of Australia’. North provides 
information to decode the problem of the so-called conflict that arises 
between national and international law. He is obligated as a matter of 
law, to place not only law first, but to give law a meaning that excludes 
‘human rights law’. The law demands that he apply ‘Australian’ law and 
therefore in effect to push international law outside of the legal equation. 
However, Justice North’s need to highlight this action shows that the 
logic of international law is already inside the operations of white law 
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and thus informing the logic of exclusion. 
In the Tampa appeal judgement, Justice Beaumont is more 
explicit about this same idea. He stated that:
Finally, it should be added that this is a municipal, and not an 
international court. Even if it were, whilst customary international law 
imposes an obligation upon a coastal state to provide humanitarian 
assistance to vessels in distress, international law imposes no obligation 
upon the coastal state to resettle those rescued in the coastal state’s 
territory. This accords with the principles of the Refugee Convention. 
By Art 33, a person who has established refugee status may not be 
expelled to a territory where his life and freedom would be threatened 
for a Convention reason (2001: [126]).
He names international law by saying that this court is not an 
international court and by the use of ‘even if ’ he asserts the supremacy of 
the domestic court. This is because (according to Beaumont’s logic) ‘even 
if ’, hypothetically, this issue was to be decided in an international court, 
such a court would lack the power to compel Australia to ‘resettle’ those 
rescued at sea. He argues this in line with principles of international 
refugee law. In so doing, he also articulates very clearly the legal logic 
that underlies Australia’s so-called ‘Pacific Solution’. Here one could be 
forgiven for thinking that far from the court taking an impartial role 
in relation to this decision, the court is acting as legal adviser to the 
executive. I say this because the judgement of the court, on this aspect 
of human rights discourse, is reflected in alarmingly similar terms in 
the ‘Pacific Solution’ policy. Human rights discourse can thus be seen 
as simultaneously absent and present in white law as the very mode 
through which substantive rights are denied.
This ‘advice’, as well as the resultant ‘Pacific Solution’, was 
consistent with a tendency by states, identified by international law 
expert Goodwin-Gill, to attempt to circumvent refugees from finding 
the asylum they seek since  
As a matter of fact, anyone presenting themselves at a frontier post 
... will already be within state territory and jurisdiction; it is for this 
reason, and the better to retain sovereign control, that states have 
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devised fictions to keep even the physically present alien technically, 
legally unadmitted (1983: 75).  
Justice French in Tampa held that:
The steps taken in relation to the MV Tampa which had the purpose 
and effect of preventing the rescues from entering the migration zone 
and arranging for their departure from Australian territorial waters 
were within the scope of executive power. The finding does not involve 
a judgement about any policy informing the exercise of that power. 
That is a matter which has been and continues to be debated in public 
and indeed international forums ... The task of the Court is to decide 
whether the power exists and whether what was done was within 
that power, not whether it was exercised wisely or well (2001: [204]).
Here, Justice French is enacting precisely that which he is denying; 
he is providing an ideological and legal justification, in advance, for 
the policy that was to become the ‘Pacific Solution’. This imperialist 
policy, sanctioned and enabled at the level of law, is premised squarely 
on the finding that there was a valid exercise of executive power 
by the government. When such a power is validated, the force of 
white sovereignty is activated and affirmed, since executive power is 
precisely the location of white sovereignty. Justice French in the Tampa 
judgement goes so far as to posit the refugee laws in relation to the 
superior law of executive power. He reasons:
Australia has obligations under international law by virtue of treaties 
to which it is a party, including the Refugee Convention of 1951 
and the 1967 Protocol. Treaties are entered into by the Executive 
on behalf of the nation. They do not, except to the extent provided 
by the statute, become part of the domestic law of Australia. The 
primary obligation which Australia has to refugees to whom the 
Convention applies is the obligation under Article 33 not to expel or 
return them to the frontiers or territories where their lives or freedoms 
would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, or 
membership of a particular social group or their political opinions. 
The question whether all or any of the rescuees are refugees has not 
been determined ... In this case, in my opinion, the question is moot 
because nothing done by the executive on the face of it amounts to a 
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breach of Australia’s obligations in respect of non-refoulement under 
the Refugee Convention (2001: [203]).
Here Justice French follows on from the reasoning of Justice 
Beaumont, in the sense that he attempts to clarify why Australia 
does not need to offer asylum and still comply with international law. 
The executive, whilst it is the body that enters into humanitarian 
agreements, is also the body that is in effect denying refuge to the 
Tampa refugees by its finding that the Convention is important only 
insofar as it is reflected in subsequent statutory law. Justice French’s 
finding effectively erases the category of refugee, let alone the question 
of asylum, by declaring the determination of refugee status to be a 
‘moot’ question. His use of ‘moot’ here, invokes for me the law school 
where legally complex questions are generated and a courtroom 
situation simulated for legal training. However, this is no simulated 
legal drama. Here, Justice French generates legal realities and legal 
contests that require resolution. Who may be classified as human and 
who may not? Who receives assistance and hospitality, and who does 
not? At this threshold moment, Justice French transforms the fate of 
the Tampa refugees into legal hypothesis, a legal fiction. Like Justice 
Beaumont, his finding serves the government well, since he renders the 
question of refugee asylum ‘moot’. This is because, even hypothetically, 
his finding is that the executive’s responsibility towards the refugee was 
not breached since the extent of what is owed is reflected in Article 33 
of the Refugee Convention, which disallows the return of the refugees 
to a place of danger. The conventional interpretation of this finding has 
been to suggest that neither Tampa judgement ‘seriously contemplated 
Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention’ (Magner 2004: 
55) and that instead, ‘both considered the seizure of the Tampa and the 
detention of its passengers under domestic law’ (ibid). However, this 
analysis misses the critical point that in order to defeat the spirit of the 
refugee convention and to assert to the primacy of domestic white law, 
the refugee convention was very ‘seriously contemplated’. This serious 
contemplation of international refugee law formed the legal foundation 
for the ‘Pacific Solution’. Magner reports that:
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In the same brief period of time that the case and appeal were heard, 
the Australian government sought to negotiate arrangements with 
other nations, such as Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Kiribati, to 
accept rescuees and process their asylum applications. Ultimately only 
Papua New Guinea and Nauru made arrangements with Australia. 
These were made in exchange for millions of dollars in aid and with 
the understanding that Australia would pay the full cost of housing 
the refugees and reviewing their claims ... Nauru is not a party to the 
Refugee Convention (2004: 56).
This was the solution that the Australian state followed, so that it 
could exclude the Tampa refugees from Australian territory. It used its 
position of superior economic power in the region to coerce countries 
into buying Australia’s refugee problem. This bargain, unequal on 
multiple levels, transformed the Tampa refugees into human cargo 
precisely by failing to qualify them as human, thus making it possible 
and legal for human life to be bought and sold in a global economy. 
Magner questions whether such behaviour was appropriate 
under international law standards (2004: 57). In a sense, this question 
is unproductive since it does not shift from the problematic assumption 
that international law conventions and protocols are essentially good 
and exist as to assist those at the mercy of the state. I have been arguing 
in this essay that Australian law uses discourses of International law 
to expand its jurisdiction of violence, since the artificial distinction 
between domestic and international law is one that works in favour 
of white law and sovereignty. Australia’s domestic laws propelled by 
‘human rights’ are international in their scope making them not only 
colonially constituted but imperial in their contemporary operations. So 
whilst the Pacific Solution was criticised as contrary to human rights, it 
must also be seen as an imperial manoeuvre enabled by human rights. 
This imperial manoeuvre can be exercised in and through the white 
law that guards white sovereignty as non-justiciable. If white colonial/
sovereign power is guarded as non- justiciable then Australia is free to 
act as an imperial power, an imperial power that apparently without 
irony, argues and defends the idea of the primacy of the state and 
importance of domestic matters being free from international control. 
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Under Prime Minister Abbott’s Operation Sovereign Borders we 
see a more complete vision of that which was envisaged by the Howard 
regime in the wake of Tampa (Phillips 2013).  The development of an 
offshore hospitality policy approach that seeks to undo the very category 
of the refugee, was assisted by the intervening Labor Government.  In 
the lead up to the 2013 Federal election, former prime minister Kevin 
Rudd sought to out-do the Coalition in his policy package designed to 
refuse hospitality (Joseph 2013). To be more specific, Rudd refused to 
enable the type of hospitality that would require the Australian state 
to be host. Instead he engineered a policy that would install Papua New 
Guinea as host to those peoples that the Australian state re-directs 
and refuses.  In return for taking the peoples unwanted to Australia, 
Papua New Guinea was to receive an aid package that would enable 
redevelopment of universities, a new hospital, upgrading roads, a new 
courts complex and the deployment of Australian police (Ritchie 
2013:1). Rudd first visited Papua New Guinea in 2008 when signing 
the Port Moresby declaration which according to Ritchie ‘represented a 
recasting of Australia’s aid relationship with its former territory’ (2013: 
1). In Rudd’s plan, the offering and refusal of hospitality was bound 
up in complex colonial relations of power. The power to refuse entry is 
premised on acting sovereign and at home on Aboriginal land. That this 
forms the basis of the power to compel another sovereign to exercise 
the will of its former imperial master attests to the ongoing imperial 
relations operating through development and aid programs. The Port 
Moresby declaration recognised the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea, 
even as the increased aid to be provided by Australia was connected 
to Papua New Guinea lifting ‘its own contribution to improving 
governance, economic infrastructure and education’ (Ritchie 2013: 2). 
Operation Sovereign Hospitality
Where the Rudd and Gillard Labor Governments sought to couch 
their refusal of hospitality in humanitarian terms – their purpose 
in stopping the boats was to save lives – the policy of the Abbott 
Government ushers in an explicitly and unapologetically militarised 
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response to the question of asylum.  Commander Angus Campbell 
heads Operation Sovereign Borders.  The position on hospitality, and 
therefore asylum seekers appears clear:
More people are becoming aware of the reality that there are two 
choices. First, be sent to Papua New Guinea or Nauru for processing 
or, second, return home. Coming to Australia is not an option. Since 
the commencement of Operation Sovereign Borders, in increasing 
numbers, potential illegal immigrants are staying informed of 
Australia’s migration policies through the media and in particular 
social media… For  example, You Tube shows an increase by 55 
per cent from the month of September to October… Since Operation 
Sovereign Borders began, there has been 77 people return home 
because they have realised they were sold a lie. People smugglers 
promised them a ticket to Australia knowing they would never reach 
that destination (Campbell 2013).
In writing about immigration detention centres, Joseph Pugliese 
has argued that ‘Outside the Centres reside the human-citizen subjects; 
inside the Centres are carceral post-humans divested of the rights and 
privileges that accrue to their human counterparts’ (2007: 69). Human 
rights exist for those who do not need them and who reside outside 
Australia’s carceral zones, whose humanity and indeed whose privilege 
is protected by virtue of their citizen status.  As if detention centres as 
places of punishment for asylum seekers were not problematic enough, 
the offshore locations, the third spaces where non-refoulement can be 
upheld, become the carceral zones of Australia’s entitled claim not only 
to Aboriginal land but to what order should be developed into being on 
the land of those Pacific partners in the region. 
I claimed at the outset of this essay that if Australian law is 
founded upon ‘originary violence’ then the possibilities for a state 
founded on that law to offer hospitality are at once extremely limited 
as well as abundant.   The increasingly shrinking space for hospitality 
to be offered on Australian soil is well captured by the Commander led 
border initiative. But what is significant about this border protection 
is that as possibilities for hospitality are shut down in first world 
zones, those who dominate those zones can be seen to be imposing 
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an imperative on their neighbours to offer that which they refuse.  In 
doing this they impose an imperialising will that seeks to use excess 
populations as productive ‘agents for development’ in areas that are in 
need of being transformed to conform to neo-liberal imperatives (Betts 
2009:5).  Australia’s militarily closed door generates a proliferation 
of hospitality in its neighbourhood.  This is a form of hospitality that 
is consistent with sovereign prerogative, a colonial and imperialising 
sovereign prerogative.  
At the time of Tampa, the time that I argue heralded the start of 
the undoing of right to seek asylum, Gungalidda Elder, Wadjularbinna 
powerfully stated: 
If we as Aboriginal people are true to our culture and spiritual beliefs, 
we should be telling the government that what they are doing to 
refugees is wrong! Our Aboriginal cultures do not allow us to treat 
people in this way ... We have our own issues to deal with but the 
refugees are fleeing hunger, deprivation, persecution and war. And 
now they are caught up in a situation with the Australian Government 
in which they are powerless. The refugees were coming here, to OUR 
country, which we as Aboriginal people have a spiritual connection 
to. Our culture teaches us that we are all connected, to the land and 
to everybody else. Our Spirit Creator and our ancient law  and 
culture would not stand for how these refugees are being treated. But 
no-one will listen to us ... Aboriginal Peoples have never been accepted 
in this land, even though it is OUR land. We have never been treated 
as equals. I will finish by reminding everyone that this is not John 
Howard’s country, it has been stolen. It was taken over by the first 
fleet of illegal boat people (2001). 
This statement makes it possible to imagine a non-violent 
response to those seeking refuge. In Perera’s words Wadjularbinna 
‘rejects a circumscribing and closed Australia, an Australia of ever 
shrinking, heavily defended borders’ (2002: 22), By drawing attention 
to Aboriginal ownership, Wadjularbinna provides a way to read the 
actions of former prime minister Howard and the Australian state 
as illegitimate, as based on theft and as having usurped the right 
of Aboriginal peoples to offer hospitality to refugees. Her critical 
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insights against state violence amount to a generosity towards refugees, 
which functions to reveal the multiple layers of white law and white 
sovereignty’s violence. Wadjularbinna’s statement is an enactment of 
Tony Birch’s critical insight that Aboriginal people must 
assert more moral authority and ownership of this country. Our 
legitimacy does not lie within the legal system and it is not dependent 
on state recognition. It lies within ourselves ... And we need to claim 
and legitimate our authority by speaking out for and protecting the 
rights of others, who live in or visit our country (2001: 17-22).
Birch’s statement here is powerful because it moves beyond the 
violent parameters established by white law to deny not only Aboriginal 
sovereignties but to deny the possibility of welcome being offered to 
those fleeing oppression and attempting to find refuge on Aboriginal 
lands.  So long as colonial sovereignty remains non-justiciable in 
Australia, ‘conditional hospitality’ by ‘invitation only’ (Kelly 2006: 
459) as well as the outsourcing of hospitality will remain legitimate 
acts of state.  
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